This paper studies the effects of domestic and foreign demand impulses in euro area economies following the Great Recession of 2008-09 and the Eurozone crisis of 2011-12.
Introduction
The Eurozone is undergoing a systemic crisis whose impact, beyond its financial dimension, can be analysed from different perspectives. One approach is to study the consequences of structural interdependence among its member economies and, more specifically, the effects of global production, i.e. the ever-finer local specialisation and geographic fragmentation of manufacturing processes, on domestic income and employment.
With the current crisis, the measurement of 'spillover' effects due to global production and finance has become a research priority (e.g. IMF 2013). It has been argued, however, that the impact of trade spillovers in the Eurozone is positive, though small (European Commission 2012, p. 108) , and in any case of reduced importance when compared to financial linkages. 1 Thus, some research questions come to the fore. First of all, how have different members of the Eurozone been affected by trade spillovers during the Great Recession of 2008-09? In the second place, but more importantly, how these outcomes compare to the effects of austerity policies undertaken in some euro area countries during 2011-12? As a matter of fact, the sovereign debt crisis and the tight fiscal discipline imposed by EU institutions have caused a new recession and soaring unemployment rates.
Looking at future possible scenarios in the Eurozone, a relevant question is whether the recessive effects of austerity policies in deficit countries could be compensated by increasing foreign demand coming from surplus economies. If this is not the case, boosting domestic final demand may be a necessary condition for a sustained recovery.
This paper aims at answering the above questions by means of a multi-regional Input-Output scheme, assessing to which extent these views correspond to empirical evidence.
Up to now, research on these issues based on Input-Output techniques has been quite scarce, probably due to data limitations. Setting up a global multiregional inter-industry scheme is truly demanding. 2 Such a complex dataset has not been freely available until the recent release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) Project (Timmer 2012; Dietzenbacher et al. 2013) . With this instrument at hand, it is possible to trace the precise source of final demand which activates output (and therefore income and employment) of each industry in every Eurozone country.
We proceed, after this short introduction, with an account of some preceding efforts to quantify trade spillovers in relation to the Great Recession (Section 2).
We introduce the methodological framework in Section 3; then Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results obtained. Finally, Section 5 summarises and concludes. 1 In fact, "the share of financing from surplus countries is larger than the share of exports to these countries" besides confirming that trade can be an important channel of how fiscal shocks are propagated across countries, show that "amplified fiscal spillovers would increase the argument in favor of coordinated fiscal stimulus" (p. 15).
Hence, both research questions are inextricably intertwined. For example, Liu (2009) quantifies the impact of the global financial crisis on China through a structural vector auto-regression analysis. The finding is that the impact is indeed sizeable: a 1% decline in economic growth in the USA, the EU and Japan is likely to lead to a 0.73% decline in growth in China one year later. He also finds that that the massive fiscal stimulus adopted in the country largely offsets the significant shortfalls in external demand. It is estimated that the fiscal stimulus package will be able to generate additional growth in the range of 4-5%.
In the case of the EU, some studies have analysed the impact at a regional level too. For instance, Rivera (2012) has investigated the uneven impact of the economic crisis on the territory of the EU; he remarked that the economic crisis primarily hit regions specializing in the manufacturing sector, although the largest unemployment increases occurred in regions with a high dependence on construction.
As refers to research specifically devoted to the impact of fiscal stimuli, Coenen G. and Trabandt (2012) focus on the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008-09. In total, the fiscal stimulus measures amount to 1.1% and 0.8% of GDP in the years 2009 and 2010, respectively 6 (this in addition to the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers and to the extra budgetary actions, such as capital injections, loans and guarantees to the financial sector). The authors find that EERP had a sizeable, although short-lived, impact on Eurozone GDP. The large impact derives from fiscal multipliers larger than one for government consumption and investment, in presence of adequate monetary accommodation. 7 In this respect, the recent debate on the size of fiscal multipliers -among macroeconomists and econometricians -has relevant policy implications. In fact, the supporters of tough austerity measures, in order to consolidate public finances, ar-6 Support for households' purchasing power (reduction in VAT, direct taxes, social security contributions, as well as direct aid, such as income support for households and support for housing or property markets) accounts for about 40% of the total stimulus. Support for investment (infrastructures and public investment) and businesses (reduction of taxes and social security contributions, subsidies, export promotion, etc.) account for roughly 30% and 20% of the total stimulus, respectively. Labour-market actions (wage subsidies and active labour-market policies) account for about 10% of the total stimulus. 7 The estimation is made by means of an extended version of the ECB's New Area-Wide Model (an openeconomy DSGE model) with a richly specified fiscal sector.
gue that fiscal multipliers are rather low and consequently restrictive fiscal policies do not cause large falls in income and production. On the other hand, even the IMF (2012) now maintains that the value of the fiscal multipliers, since the Great Recession, has significantly increased, suggesting a more gradual fiscal adjustment. 8 However, macro-econometric analyses of this sort are usually based on complex relationships between aggregate magnitudes, 9 hindering the emergence of aggregate properties coming from inter-industry interactions between thousands of industries in different countries around the globe. It may turn out that sectoral composition of production and trade is of utmost importance to assess aggregate outcomes for income and employment.
In fact, Groot et al. (2011) , in investigating the impact of the crisis on European countries and regions, consider three classes of explanations: (i) the extent to which countries are integrated in the global economy via financial and trade linkages, (ii) the differences in their institutional frameworks, and (iii) the differences in their sectoral composition. The latter turns out to be the most important factor.
By acknowledging this insight, few recent studies have dealt with the research questions at stake by resorting to multi-regional Input-Output analysis, where each region represents a national economy. For example, Bems et al. (2010) use a global Input-Output framework to quantify US and EU demand spillovers and the elasticity of world trade to GDP during the global recession of 2008-09. The estimated elasticity of world trade to GDP is 2.8, when final demand changes in all countries. 10 In particular, they find that 20-30% of the decline in the US and EU final demand was borne by foreign countries, especially NAFTA and emerging Europe, respectively. 11
Our paper goes precisely in this direction, by introducing a set of metrics to quantify the share of own income activated by different sources of foreign final demand in a global accounting framework. We focus not only on structural relations 8 It has even been concluded that "growth disappointments should be larger in economies that planned greater fiscal cutbacks" (Blanchard and Leigh 2013, p. 3) . 9 This is also the case of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) , who adopt an innovative method to identify fiscal shocks and apply it to a large set of OECD countries. 10 Thus, for an elasticity of 4, demand forces alone account for roughly 70% of the trade collapse. Crucially, the estimated elasticity of trade to GDP is high because the model allows for asymmetries in demand changes across sectors. Their analysis reflects in particular the role played by durable goods, which are both highly traded as a final demand component and tightly integrated into global supply chains. 11 However, due to the database they employ (GTAP 7 for year 2004), and the estimation method adopted for off-diagonal inter-regional trade matrices, results concerning year 2008-09 might have to be treated with care.
(i.e. year-by-year coefficient ratios), but also on the computation of actual and model-implied demand-induced GDP changes.
However, differently from traditional domestic multiplier analyses discussed above (e.g. Coenen G. and Trabandt 2012) , our paper deals with an 'open' global Input-Output scheme where consumption and investment are not endogenised as a function of income. Hence, the transmission mechanism at work, i.e. final demand trade spillovers, corresponds to the operation of domestic and international 'Leontief' multipliers, triggered by inter-country linkages of final demand. Therefore, in principle, it is not possible to make accurate comparisons between multipliers computed under these two different methodologies. Note, however, that both notions may be conceptually related, e.g. " [w] ith increasing fragmentation, domestic multiplier effects of fiscal stimulus programs will be lower, while foreign spillovers increase" (Timmer et al. 2012, p. 27 ).
On grounds of method, the case for pursuing a global Input-Output accounting exercise, with respect to standard techniques, may also be considered. First, rather than performing out-of-sample prediction of endogenous variables during crisis periods (as in calibrated DSGE models or VAR specifications), we perform a purely accounting exercise of the Great Recession, decomposing actual changes in income attributable to actual changes in domestic final demand in every region. Second, by adopting an Input-Output structure, we take a clear-cut theoretical position as regards the induced character of vertical specialisation. In many econometric specifications (e.g. Beetsma et al. 2006, p. 660) , nothing prevents that lagged intermediate exports may be used to explain contemporaneous exports of final goods, which we find difficult to justify, from a theoretical point of view.
In the third place, as regards definitional issues, in canonical GVAR specifications (e.g. Pesaran et al. 2004, p. 132) , contemporaneous domestic prices and quantities are linked with lagged and contemporaneous prices and quantities, using a fixed constant matrix of bilateral trade as weights. But how can it be consistent to evaluate cross-country effects in output while assuming a constant or predetermined average value for such a crucial component of GDP such as exports? By adopting an accounting approach domestic magnitudes are not linked through indirect statistical relationships, but through consistent actual accounting identities.
Finally, there is also an important conceptual difference between our approach and standard DSGE models. Within the latter, spillovers are given a behavioural interpretation: "if it [spillover] is meant to refer to unintended consequences, there are no spillovers when policy reaction functions take into account other policymakers' instruments" (Corsetti in the Panel discussion of Beetsma et al. 2006, p. 685) . On the contrary, our definition of spillover is solely based on observable and measurable magnitudes. We view this as an essential point in conveying the fact that empirical general interdependence overrides the methodological individualism implied by such a behavioural definition of spillover.
To sum up, besides providing a set of metrics based on a global Input-Output accounting scheme, our main contribution lies in performing an analysis of final demand trade spillovers for euro area economies not only during the Great Recession (2008-09), but also in relation to the Eurozone crisis . In view of the enduring consequences of these two recessive episodes, it would be useful for the design of coordinated policy alternatives to quantify their impact on GDP. This is approached in the sections that follow.
Methodology

Basic accounting framework
The main accounting identity for the expenditure side of a global system with K regions with n industries in each of them and three components of final demand u = {c g , c p , gcf } is given by: 12
By defining the matrix of intermediate production and trade (X) in intensive terms (per unit of industry gross output): A := X z −1 , we obtain an (n × K) × (n × K) "global sourcing matrix" (Stehrer and Ward 2012, p. 166) Global production is directly linked by matrix A. However, by looking at the economic process as a circular flow (Leontief 1928) , this framework allows to explicitly account for indirect linkages between each source of final demand (in matrix F) and (consequent) gross value added and (originating) employment (which are income side magnitudes), assessing to which extent these are induced or activated by each final buyer. In this way a scalar figure for each "final demand-source industry" combination may summarise the comprehensive operation of the global network of intermediate inputs.
To do this we first define the (n × K) × (3 × K) matrix S: Given that the rows of matrix S sum to one, exhausting the value of gross output by industry in each region, we may decompose the proportion of value added ( v) or employment ( l) for every source industry in all regions activated by each final demand component: (row-wise) allows us to quantify, at different levels, the direct, internally derived and spillover effects on value added (income) and employment, triggered by global final demand. 13 With these basic elements in mind, our aim is to derive country-aggregate consequences of disaggregated industry-specific final demand impulses, by means of a series of metrics introduced below: the structural dependence of 'activated' on 'activating' regions, foreign trade spillovers triggered by final demand and, finally, sources of changes in employment. . Hence, the evolution of θ r,s v describes the ultimate sources of final demand which generate income in each region, thus assessing the dependence of an activated country on all others as well as on its own domestic demand.
13 In order to aggregate, two basic summation rules that we will use throughout are: e 14 We thank an anonymous referees for calling our attention on the need to justify our procedure of introducing a multi-sectoral accounting framework and then reporting aggregate country-level results. The key point to be grasped is that country-level aggregation is performed only after disaggregated sectoral computations have been carried out. There is a crucial difference between aggregating first and then inverting a matrix, with respect to inverting a matrix first and then aggregating the results, due to the fact that matrix inversion is a non-linear operation. Hence, compositional effects still play a crucial role, as each component is specified in its full sectoral dimension, and it is only when results at the most detailed level are obtained that a bottom-up aggregation is performed. This notwithstanding, exploring the industry-level differences composing a country-aggregate spillover figure is a very relevant question for further research, especially within a global Input-Output accounting framework.
Final Demand Trade Spillovers
A quantitative assessment of income reductions induced by final demand should distinguish between domestic and foreign determinants. As a starting point, consider matrix M v defined in equation (3) above. By assuming that only final demand matrix F is changing amongst the components of M v , we may apply element-wise growth rates of final demand to matrix M v and obtain the resulting trade spillovers.
Mathematically, we compute: 15 Additionally, we may specify the change in each final demand component u of every activating region s, with respect to aggregate domestic final demand f s as:
with f s = r u e T r Fe (u) s , and where we aggregate over final demand components g s(u) f to obtain g s f . Note that any proportional change in domestic final demand does not necessarily translate into an equal proportional change in own income. But given that, in a global setting, the aggregate change in world income equals the aggregate change in global final demand, part of domestic demand changes are most probably absorbed by foreign countries. Hence, the extent to which changes in domestic final uses are borne by others provides a measure of trade spillovers. With g r,s v and g s f , a synthetic indicator of country-specific final demand trade spillovers -due to Bems et al.
(2010) -may be obtained in our framework by computing:
where λ r v "captures the share of the change in final demand that is borne by foreign countries" (Bems et al. 2010, p. 310) . Intuitively, for a negative shock, λ r v conveys the idea of the percentage of the change in domestic demand that 'leakages' into income reductions of others.
As a complementary measure, we compute the proportional change in income of country r originating from final demand changes of countries s = r, with respect to the weighted average of proportional demand changes in these countries:
Intuitively, ϕ r v conveys the idea of the extent to which an economy can take advantage of, or be particularly affected by, demand changes in the rest of the world.
This metric may be plausibly interpreted as an elasticity (a ratio of proportional changes). Hence, a value greater than one indicates that the response of own income to changes in foreign demand has been more than proportional, while a value close to zero suggests that the effect of domestic demand dominates over global dynamics.
Both λ r v and ϕ r v play a crucial role in explaining the connection between own income changes and different sources of final demand. We may see this by departing from equation (6), adopting the perspective of country r, and making explicit the separation between domestic (r) and foreign (s = r) sources:
From (8) we have that:
while from (9) we may obtain:
Hence, by introducing (11) and (12) into (10) we may finally decompose demand-induced income changes in country r into two determinants:
Notably, expression (13), for given technical conditions, allows to explain income changes by means of a weighted average of changes in domestic and foreign final demand, the weights being (the complement to one of) λ r v and ϕ r v , respectively. Finally, in order to obtain a more detailed picture of each activating foreign source of demand, we compute the 'contribution to growth' of each component of final demand u in every activating region s to the aggregate change in income of activated region r:
For example, δ ita,deu v stands for the percentage of the aggregate change in Italian income which can be attributed to changes in German final demand.
Structural decomposition of changes in employment
Structural decomposition analysis is a technique that allows to decompose the change in a variable into changes in its determinants. In this case, we focus on the change in matrix M l = a l BF between 2008 (t = 0) and 2009 (t = 1). 16
Being defined as the product of three elements: unitary direct labour requirements ( a l ), total (direct and indirect) input requirements per unit of monetary output (B) and final demand by region and component (F), changes in matrix M l are due to the composite change of its determinants. Each possible decomposition of its growth should leave two components fixed while allowing for the third one to change between time periods. Hence, from among the 3! = 6 possible combinations we have chosen to compute:
16 From (2) and (4), matrix M l = lS can also be expressed as M l = l z −1 BF. Defining a l = l z −1 as the diagonal matrix of direct labour requirements per unit of monetary gross output of each industry in every region, gives M l = a l BF.
As has been rightly pointed out by Dietzenbacher and Los (1998) , in the presence of discrete time periods elapsing between observations, decompositions cannot be unique. Therefore, while reporting the relative standard deviation of multiple decomposition forms in Appendix B, we here provide an economic intuition as regards the choice of (15).
We aim to separate the operation of three effects: In this way, for each "final demand-source industry" combination it is possible to decompose the change in employment into the three above-mentioned determinants. By conveniently aggregating ∆M l as defined in (15) On the basis of the set of metrics just introduced, the following section reports the results of their application to analyse Euro Area economies during the Great Recession (2008-09) and the Eurozone Crisis (2011-12).
Empirical computations and discussion of results
The main data source to perform the empirical computations has been the World Multi-regional Input-Output scheme provided by this database conforms to the requirements needed to set-up the accounting framework discussed in Section 3.
The empirical exploration performed in the present paper explicitly focuses on a selection of eleven Eurozone countries, grouped in two categories: 20 (i) the core-EZ (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) A first characterisation of the trends in international production sharing for the 11 countries analysed emerges by looking at = 100 in each of the years analysed (1995, 2002, 2007, 2009) . Hence, for the case of Germany (DEU), in 1995, 80.8% of its income (i.e. gross value added) was generated by German final demand, 7% by the rest of the EZ, 2.9% by the rest of the EU27 (other than the EZ) and 9.3% by final demand coming from the rest of the world, noting that 80.8 + 7.0 + 2.9 + 9.3 = 100.
Trends in global sourcing
their A second peculiarity of Germany and Austria is their increasing trend in the dependence on final demand from Eurozone partners, while for the remaining nine countries this figure decreased (in a sizeable way in Belgium and Ireland) during the considered time span. Notably, this is not so for the dependence on final demand coming from (non-EZ) EU27 economies, which increased for all countries but Portugal and Greece, between 1995 and 2007. 23 Notably, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and most of all Ireland out-stand for their dependence on foreign sources; the contrary holds for Greece, with around 90% of its income being generated from domestic demand. Moreover, the only trend common to all countries is the increasing importance of final demand coming from outside the EU in determining own GDP, a trend which is particularly strong in the case of Ireland and, again, Austria and Germany. 24
The Great Recession (2008-09)
The way in which the trends in production sharing across Eurozone economies came to terms with the collapse of world trade during the Great Recession may be inferred from ). Spillover figure λ r v = 0.82 indicates that 82% of the fall in German final demand (of 2.31 points) was borne by income reductions in foreign countries, while the elasticity value of ϕ r v = 1.52 > 1 indicates that the response of own income to changes in foreign demand has been more than proportional. is the weighted average of final demand changes in all countries but r.
Detailed explanation for spillover indicators λ r v and ϕ r v can be found in section (3.2.2). Columns (1)- (2), (5) and (6) computed according to equations (6), (8), and (9), respectively.
Column (4) is specified as: g s =r f = s =r g s f (fs/ s =r fs). Column (2) can be obtained as: (2) changes which had to be faced by income reductions of other trade partners. Not surprisingly, for Germany, Austria and Belgium more than 75% of the drop in domestic final demand was 'exported' to others. The fact that these countries' GDP depends for more than 30% on foreign sources of final demand (as can be seen from θ r,r v for year 2009 on Table 1 ) helps to explain this fact. The case of Italy is of interest, given that it structurally depends to a lesser extent on foreign sources, though during 2009 more than 60% of its drop in final demand was borne by other countries. This result for Italy acquires more significance when compared to France, which has almost the same level of structural foreign dependence (as can be read from Table 1 ) but almost 80% of the fall in domestic final demand corresponded to a drop in its GDP, during 2008-09.
Countries with a sharp decline of domestic demand had a relatively lower value for λ r v (e.g. Finland, Spain, Portugal). In fact, it is sensible to guess that λ r v for Ireland would have been higher, had it not been for its dramatic fall in domestic final demand (-13.09 p.p.). In this connection, from g r,r v /g r v -the ratio of columns (1) to (2) -we infer for which economies the fall in domestic demand has been the crucial determinant of demand-induced reductions in GDP: Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal. On the contrary, by looking at ϕ r v -column (6) -we observe the particularly high amplifying effect of changes in demand from the rest of the world for income reductions in Germany, Austria and Finland (with ϕ r v significantly greater than unity).
Hence, during the Great Recession, PIIGS have generally been more sensitive to domestic demand reductions while core-EZ countries have been more vulnerable to (and inflicting more damage to) their trade partners. Interestingly, the dynamics of France and Italy went precisely in opposite directions to that of their respective group, i.e. Italy resembled a core-EZ country, while the crucial role of domestic demand in France was similar to that of other countries of the Eurozone periphery.
In any case, we have only considered so far demand-induced GDP reductions, i.e. we have implicitly assumed that the technique in use remained fixed when computing income changes. However, given that technical coefficients have changed during the crisis, actual GDP reductions did not coincide with those implied solely by final demand trade spillovers.
Therefore, if data is available, technique effects should be also considered when assessing the determinants of sharp GDP reductions, like those observed between 2008 and 2009. Notably, the fact that employment has also had an acute reaction during the Great Recession, suggests that it might be revealing to decompose actual changes in employment -rather than GDP -into final demand and technique effects, in order to clearly see to what extent forms of labour protection prevented employment from falling accordingly to the full reduction in output.
The latter consideration leads us to consider Table 3 While the overall outcome of the contraction in global final demand is negative for all countries, we can decompose it into four items, whose sign varies across regions:
(i) the effect of changes in unitary direct labour requirements (Direct Labour); (ii) the effect of changes in input requirements per unit of monetary output (Total Inputs); and (iii) the effect of decreasing final demand (Final Demand). According to the sign combination of these effects, we identify three cases:
(1) Germany, Austria, Finland, France, Greece and Italy: Effect (i) is positive, while effects (ii) and (iii) are negative. During recessions, intermediate transactions of circulating capital items tend to decrease and being substituted with a reduction in inventories, which of course would lead to a decrease in input coefficients. At the same time, however, output goes down, so that unitary requirements, ceteris paribus, increase. In this case, the former effect prevailed, and the net outcome is an average decrease of input coefficients. Moreover, increasing direct labour requirements prevented the loss of about 1.7 million jobs in Germany, and more than 1.6 million jobs in both France and Italy, making the net effect much less dramatic than it could have been.
(2) Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal. Effects (i) and (ii) are positive and (iii) is negative. Though more modest than in the previous case, especially in Portugal, some form of cyclical productivity decrease ameliorated potential employment reduction. In this case, however, intermediate transactions did not go down to such an extent as to counteract the effect of output fall on input coefficients.
(3) Spain and Ireland. All effects other than (ii) are negative. It deserves to be noticed that these are the only two countries in which no forms of labour hoarding were implemented in support of employment; on the contrary, the Great Recession caused a more than proportional jobs cut, which has been particularly harsh in Spain. No surprise, therefore, that the economic outlook for Spain and Ireland were among the worst of the whole Eurozone.
At this point, the question that remains to be faced is the geographical distribution of final demand impulses which originated GDP reductions during the Great Recession. To assess the extent of the response of Eurozone incomes to the realised fall of final demand in the US, we computed -for given technical coefficients, and by means of equation (14) -the contribution to the change in aggregate gross value added induced by changes in each component of domestic, as well as foreign, final demand. Results are reported in Table 4 . 27 As can be read from column (7) of Table 4 , income reductions directly and indirectly caused by the fall in US final demand have been modest for the economies analysed, especially when compared to intra-EZ and intra-EU effects -columns (5) and (6), respectively. Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy have been particularly vulnerable to worsening international conditions relative to the fall in domestic final demand, as can be read from column (4). Moreover, in all countries but Ireland, general government consumption -column (2) -has played an important counter-cyclical role, while the dynamics of gross capital formation -column (3) -remains the crucial source of falling GDP during the Great Recession.
27 The reading key for a representative row of Table 4 runs as follows. The row for Germany (DEU) describes the percentage distribution of demand-induced changes in GDP by source of origin (for a Total of −100.00 in column (9), the negative sign implying that aggregate income change has been negative).
Thus, we read that domestic final demand (column (4)) accounted for 11.26 points of demand-induced GDP reductions. Columns (1)- (3) disaggregate further the domestic component, having that private and government consumption (cp in column (1) and cg in column (2)) go in opposite direction with respect to the negative effect exerted by gross investments (gcf in column (3) Notes: (4)= (1)+ (2)+ (3) and (9) (14) 4.3 The Eurozone Crisis The implementation, from summer 2009, of fiscal stimulus packages in some countries -together with a slight increase in fixed capital formation, particularly of machinery -led to a recovery that lasted for the whole 2010, both in core-EZ countries and, to a smaller extent, in some countries of the Eurozone periphery.
However, the sovereign debt crisis was about to explode.
By the end of 2011, almost all countries amongst PIIGS were implementing strong fiscal restrictions and drastic reforms of pension systems, labour markets, and public welfare in general. As a direct consequence of budget consolidation policies, sharp reductions in government expenditure (between -2.9% and -4.4%) followed throughout 2012. It seems important, therefore, to provide a quantitative assessment of the effects of fiscal austerity on the whole set of Eurozone economies analysed.
While structural decompositions may be computed when full observations for two time periods are available, in the presence of partial information only isolated effects can be estimated. In this case, departing from direct labour (a l ) and total input (B) requirements for 2009 (the last year of available data in the WIOD database), we applied to the 2009 final demand matrix (F) a set of growth rates for the period 2011-12, distinguishing between final demand components (c p , c g , gcf ) in each activating region s. 28 Therefore, matrix G f took the form:
The limitations of applying a uniform growth rate to each column of matrix F are manifold. Two of particular relevance are: (i) if only F is assumed to be changing, relevant movements in technical coefficients might remain unattended (precisely when employment lags begin to be felt as firms are no longer able to follow job retention practices in the expectation of demand recovery), and (ii) compositional changes in the structure of final expenditure are not considered. As an aside, by discussing results in terms of GDP aggregates by region, the sectoral composition of changes within each country remains in the background, deserving an own separate exploration.
Differently from the structural decomposition and the actual final demand trade spillovers, which are strictly an accounting exercise of what has actually happened between two discrete time-periods, the model-implied demand spillovers -com- With these limitations in mind, model implied income changes triggered by final demand dynamics during the Eurozone crisis have been computed using the metrics introduced in section 3.2.2. Synthetic indicators are reported in Table 5 . 30
To begin with, note that while the dynamics of global final demand has been expansionary (as can be read from g s =r f
in column (4) of the Table) , the only two 28 We thus considered growth rates to be uniform across industries and destination country for a given component u of final demand from activating country s. Appendix C reports the set of growth rates utilised for this exercise. 29 We thank an anonymous referee for calling our attention on the interplay between final demand and technical coefficients in estimates of isolated spillover effects. 30 The reading key for Table 5 follows the same logic as previously specified for the case of Table 2 . is the weighted average of final demand changes in all countries but r.
Column (4) is specified as: g s =r f = s =r g s f (fs/ s =r fs). Column (2) can be obtained as: (2) countries of the subset analysed with positive demand-induced GDP spillovers have been Germany and Austria (both with only +0.37 p.p.). And even in Germany the domestic contribution to demand spillovers has been negative (though approaching zero). Hence, differently from the Great Recession of 2008-09 (see Table 2 ), during 2012 the Eurozone has been going against the upward trend of the world economy.
Related to this first point, in all countries but Germany and Austria, the contraction explained solely by the negative impulse of domestic final demand has been greater than the total demand-induced GDP fall, i.e. the ratio g r,r v /g r v is greater than one. Hence, in all these countries, foreign demand sources have had a partially offsetting positive effect on income, greater in core-EZ surplus countries like Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands; while almost negligible for the case of PI-IGS (with the exception of Ireland). Hence, it seems clear that the contractionary consequences of austerity policies have not been offset by foreign demand within the Eurozone periphery (not even for Ireland).
This prevalence of domestic sources in explaining the degree of demand-induced GDP reductions is confirmed by comparing columns (5) and (6) of Table 5 with the respective columns of Table 2 : higher values for both λ r v and ϕ r v can be found during the Great Recession (2008-09) as compared to the Eurozone crisis . In fact, while for Germany and Finland the share of domestic demand changes which has to be borne by others -λ r v in column (5) -has remained relatively stable, the reduction for the case of Italy has been dramatic. Thus, the role of the Italian economy as an agent capable of inflicting potentially destabilising effects to its trade partners has been reduced.
Predictably, the fall in ϕ r v has been more acute than that observed for λ r v . Given that ϕ r v captures the extent to which a given economy has been hurt by or taken advantage of the dynamics of global final demand, the relatively low values for column (6) of Table 5 make apparent the difficult situation of each Eurozone country with respect to the world economy. The case of Spain is exemplary: during 2012 the elasticity of domestic income spillovers with respect to the growth of foreign final demand has been almost zero. Columns (4)=(1)+(2)+ (3) and (12) To complete the picture given so far, Table 6 displays the geographic distribution of demand-induced GDP changes by originating source of final demand. 31 With the exception of Germany and Austria, in both core-EZ countries and PIIGS, the most 31 The reading key for Table 6 follows the same logic as previously specified for the case of Table 4 .
important determinant of demand spillovers has been the domestic component -δ r,r v in column (4) of the By computing the difference between columns (5) and (10) we see that while for Germany, Austria and Finland this negative effect has been more than offset, the opposite occurs in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. Hence, for three surplus economies at the heart of the Eurozone, extra-EZ spillovers still dominate over 'imported' austerity consequences. 34
To sum up, during the Eurozone crisis the drop in domestic final demand has been the key driver of demand-induced GDP reductions, both for core-EZ countries (with the exception of Germany and Austria) as well as for PIIGS. When comparing Table 6 with Table 4 , the role of trade spillovers during the Great Recession (2008-09) was clearly of greater relevance. This notwithstanding, first-order negative effects exerted by PIIGS on core-EZ countries suggests that austerity policies undertaken within the Eurozone periphery did have sizeable consequences beyond 32 The figure for Ireland is particularly striking (-463%), noting that it has been almost entirely offset exclusively by foreign demand coming from outside the EU, USA and BRIC (+449% under column (11) of the Table) . 33 In fact, the case of Ireland emerges with its own peculiarities, being the only country which was able to take advantage of growth in the US, BRIC and the RoW to the point of (almost entirely) offsetting the negative demand impulses coming from other Eurozone economies. 34 Moreover, note that the effects coming from the remaining six Euro Area economies (not explicitly analysed), as well as from the rest of EU countries -columns (7) and (8), respectively -are clearly of a smaller order of magnitude (with the exception of the presumable influence of the UK on Belgium and Ireland), as compared to those coming from PIIGS.
national borders. Therefore, if the Eurozone is to achieve a sustained recovery, pursuing a coordinated fiscal stimulus should not be excluded from the policy alternatives to be considered.
Summary of results and concluding remarks
After the financial crisis (2007-08) and the Great Recession (2008-09) that hurt the global economy, EU countries have been injured by the Eurozone crisis . Its deepening has also been caused by the uncertain, delayed and inadequate economic policy responses. Then, the euro area has suffered from a new recession, hitting especially the "PIIGS" (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain)
countries. While unemployment and social pain are soaring, the financial situation of these countries has not substantially improved; this self-inflicting result is the consequence of coordinated austerity measures in times of recession.
In considering policy alternatives for the Eurozone it is of utmost importance to assess the role of effective demand in determining activity levels as well as the international trade transmission of final demand impulses. In order to measure these two phenomena, we have proposed a set of metrics derived from a global InputOutput framework. From a methodological point of view, we have advanced a decomposition of demand-induced GDP changes as a weighted average of domestic and foreign final demand dynamics, the weights being two 'spillover' indicators introduced in section 3.2. Moreover, we have analysed the contribution to the growth of GDP by each foreign source of final demand and, in order to consider the effects of changing technical coefficients, we have performed a structural decomposition of employment changes, when data requirements allowed.
The results of the computations performed may be summarised in four key points:
(1) The evolution of the share of domestic income generated by foreign sources of final demand between 1995 and 2009 (Table 1) showed that: (i) the most visible effect of global sourcing is the reduction in the share of GDP activated by domestic demand in Germany and Austria, and (ii) the presence of a common currency (the euro) has not led to an increase in the share of own income originated in intra-Eurozone final demand (Germany and Austria being the only exceptions).
(2) During the Great Recession, PIIGS have generally been more sensitive to domestic demand reductions while core-EZ countries have been more vulnerable to (and inflicting more damage to) their trade partners. In fact, as can be read from Table 2 , for Germany, Austria and Belgium more than 75% of the drop in domestic final demand was 'exported' to others. Moreover, from Table 4 , it emerged that demand-induced GDP reductions in Eurozone countries due to the fall in US final demand have been overall modest, when compared to intra-EZ and intra-EU spilllovers.
(3) The structural decomposition of employment changes during the Great Recession (Table 3) These results hint at the consequences of an "export-led" strategy in which all Eurozone countries pursue a competitive wage deflation by means of loose employment protection and increased vulnerability to extra-Eurozone demand. It emerged quite clearly that this state of affairs is not likely to be sustainable. 35 Hence, the key policy implication is that, while coordinated austerity measures are self-inflicting, Eurozone countries should reconsider the prominent role of domestic sources of final demand in determining activity levels, acknowledging that 35 Note, in fact, that even the greatest world exporter, China, has seen a reversing trend in its income dynamics: "[d]omestic final demand for non-tradables has become the main source of growth" (Timmer et al. 2012, p. 2, italics added) .
of argument, a preliminary analysis of cross-income elasticities has been carried out in order to identify those economies which could both benefit the most from a coordinated fiscal stimulus and, at the same time, induce the highest amplifying effects on others. Unfortunately, due to space constraints, the analysis could not be included in the final version of the paper. However, for the interested reader, these additional results are available upon request. 37 Of course, it would be better that a demand-led policy should be undertaken at the EU level, together with structural policies as well as more effective crisis-management tools to counteract huge macroeconomic Recall the structural decomposition of employment changes defined in expression (15) of Section 3.2.3:
In order to evaluate whether the conclusions derived from Table 3 depend 
= ( a l1 − a l0 )B 1 F 1 + a l0 (B 1 − B 0 )F 0 + a l0 B 1 (F 1 − F 0 ) (1)- (6) correspond to each of the alternative decompositions in equations (B1)-(B6), respectively. Column 'RSD' corresponds to the relative standard deviation (RSD) of each row, computed as RSD = |σx/µx|.
In fact, throughout the analysis in the main text, we have classified Greece into the group of countries with a negative 'Total Inputs' effect. 
